

SECRET


military Reserve

28 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Meeting of the Military Reserve Advisory Committee

1. The CIA Military Reserve Advisory Committee met at 0900 on 19 December 1960 in the D/Pers conference room. This meeting was the first attended by a representative of OTR. Those present were:



DD/Pers, chairman
C/MMPD
DD/I representative
DD/I "
DD/T "
OTR "
RAS/MMPD
MRB/MMPD, secretary

2. The meeting was called by [] to discuss an agenda of questions raised by D/Pers concerning CIA military reserve training and policy. These questions stemmed, in part, from the recommendation in the Inspector General's Survey of the CIA Training Program, August 1960, that:

"The DTR confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g., International Communism, could be handled by OTR for the reservists."

[] reported that MMPD had prepared a suggested draft of answers to the several questions raised by D/Pers, based on MMPD's long experience (historical) with many of the problems contained therein.

3. The Committee discussed each question in turn and reached unanimous agreement on the nature of the recommendations to be made to D/Pers and DD/S. The bare gist of these recommendations, and some of their

SECRET

15

SECRET

implications to OTR, are as follows. I will not attempt to include here the full explanation or back-up material that will accompany the recommendations to DD/S.

- a. CIA should continue to sponsor military reserve units.
- b. CIA should continue with its present arrangements with the individual Military Departments rather than seek authorization for a joint military reserve unit.
- c. Membership in CIA-sponsored military reserve units should continue to be limited to commissioned reservists, but CIA (MMFD) should also seek to improve and extend its means of control over the approximately 756 enlisted reservists currently employed by this Agency.

The Agency has excellent contacts with a number of the affected military commands and the Selective Service, and can probably manage to retain effective control over most of its key enlisted reservists. Commo represents the most critical (and largest), single group; it can be assumed, however, that the Department of Defense will not take an action which would jeopardize the Agency's critical communications operation.

The number of JOT's affected is not great; however, Personnel recruiters and the JOTF staff need a firm, Agency policy statement concerning the status and responsibilities of Agency enlisted reservists. Further, a large percentage of ER "problems" can be averted if each enlisted reservist will report to MMFD for a briefing prior to going overseas!

- d. The Agency-sponsored reserve units should be open to all employee reservists.

Under the present arrangements, all of our reservists must be called up for mobilization assignments with CIA in the event of general mobilization. Obviously, not all CIA military reservists will fit into the Agency's "war plans." Nevertheless, to help ensure the least interruption of the Agency's functioning, we would call up everyone and readjust afterward.

2 **SECRET**

SECRET

e. The Agency should take ~~an~~ action or position now on mobilization assignments for reservists whose military grade is either much lower or much higher than civilian grade. Basically, these must be treated as individual cases or be a matter for individual decision. In time of war, a board of review might be appropriate to deal with extreme cases in the best interests of the Agency.

f. As a matter of general policy the Agency should not now encourage reservists, who are eligible, to transfer to the retired reserve (after 20 or more years' satisfactory service) to allow spaces for younger officers. Rather, the Agency policy should be to chop from its sponsored units those reservists who fail to participate actively in the reserve training program. If spaces for younger officers become critical, then older, eligible officers should be urged to retire on the basis of potential utility to the Agency (or lack of potential) if recalled to active duty.

g. The Agency should not encourage civilian personnel who are eligible for direct commission in the reserves to apply now for same. (An enlisted reservist who has been working toward a commission is another matter.) In the event of emergency, the Military Departments have mechanisms by which the Agency may sponsor individuals for direct commissions. The objective is to hold our commissioned ranks down to those for whom the Agency has a real need.

h. The Agency reserve training program should emphasize military training—that is, training in military as opposed to CIA subject matter.

In effect, the envisioned military reserve training program would have several facets:

- (1) Acting for the DGI and the Deputy Directorates, the Military Reserve Advisory Committee would study and recommend military reserve policies, program training objectives and content, inactive and active duty training policies and standards, etc.
- (2) MCRP, through positions to be recommended for this purpose, would act as the executive agent for administration and coordination of

SECRET

SECRET

the program, conduct liaison with the Military Departments and secure military speakers and training materials, arrange for individual active training duty in accordance with Agency and military policies and standards as they apply to individual "reservist career development," etc.

- (3) Actual training would be developed and conducted by the reservists themselves, as at present, augmented by appropriate guest speakers.
- (4) The same training program would be accomplished by DD/S, DD/I, and DD/F reservists. (This applies primarily to Army and Air Force reservists. While there would probably continue to be a number of joint meetings, the Navy and Marine Corps reservists would continue to carry out training programs prescribed by their services.)
- (5) As already indicated, the proposed training program would emphasize military subject matter "above the company level"--that is, military subject matter essential to the maintenance of general, professional military knowledge and skills by military reserve officers. At the same time, the program would ensure familiarization with the Agency's wartime responsibilities and functions for support of the military and how these are to be carried out.
- (6) It is understood that we would discourage random, individually-secured, annual active training duty tours. Rather, it is hoped that more productive and suitable training duty can be arranged with the various service schools providing training or experience in military functions more closely related to the CIA wartime missions. Such duty would include the Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Special Warfare at Fort Bragg, duty with ASA, NSA, at the Chemical Warfare Center, etc., etc.

- (7) OTR, presumably, would be called upon to support the training program, through

4 **SECRET**

SECRET

- (a) instructor training, plus other consultative services of the OTR Educational Specialists (both reserve officers);
- (b) within current capabilities, training aids and audio-visual aids;
- (c) use, after hours, of classroom space and facilities, as at present;
- (d) use of training source material, where appropriate, for CIA-required subject requirements;
- (e) provision of or support of, within capabilities and subject to CIA guidance as to priorities, "military training" to reserve officers at [] in subjects peculiar to the CIA, wartime mission in support of the military; 25X1A
- (f) provision, as at present, of requisite training in CIA professional skills and techniques related to the CIA wartime mission, to all CIA personnel requiring this training. NOTE: Military reserve training should not duplicate or be requested in lieu of those regular, OTR-conducted courses, whether in the field of paramilitary operations or International Communism. Establishment of training standards and scheduling of Agency personnel for training for wartime functions is a command responsibility. 25X1A
- (g) Arrangements would be made also for training, by reserve officers, of reservists [] (Commo has agreed to this); some support may be required of OTR.
- (h) The Director of Training's general supervisory and coordinating responsibilities with respect to the overall program may be accomplished through his representative on the advisory committee.
- (i) MMFD would develop criteria for release of CIA recruits to the military, for deferment, or for mobilization assignments.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1A 4. Paragraph 3.h. (7) (e) above, may call for clarification. The emphasis here is on military training. What the committee seemed to have in mind was a two-week (10 working day?) combination course of review of CIA military support operations, a CPK or FTX, and military-type refresher training in weapons (primarily .45 pistol and .30 carbine) and map-and-compass. Order of battle could also be appropriate, but justification of the training [] would be the inclusion of significant CIA-subject matter related to the reservists' wartime CIA/reserve officer responsibilities. Obviously, the latter will have to be defined....

25X1A 5. The above is for your information only. It is my interpretation of the opinion and intent of the committee. The secretary, [] will draft the official findings and recommendations. From our, OTR point of view, the key points seem to be

a. Emphasis on military training, conducted by the reservists themselves.

b. CIA training of CIA personnel--military reservist or non-reservist--for specific CIA wartime jobs is an OTR responsibility, responsive to Deputy Directorate requirements.

c. Therefore, for other than reasonable support, OTR's training is job-oriented. The reserve training program, on the other hand, would be primarily military in nature, supplemented with other information of general interest, related to the reservists' role in the CIA wartime mission.

SIGNED

[]
Chief, Plans and Policy Staff

on: C/OS

[]
C/ICP
MMFD/MRS []

SECRET